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RECENT CASES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
ATTORNEY NOT ENTITLED TO
HEARING UPON DENIAL OF
ADMISSION PRO HA C VICE
Leis v. Flynt'
The grand jury of Hamilton County, Ohio, indicted Larry Flynt and
Hustler magazine, and charged them with violation of an Ohio obscenity
statute. 2 On February 25, 1977, Herald Fahringer and Paul Cambria, attorneys for Flynt and Hustler respectively, entered an appearance by local
counsel as attorneys of record in the pending criminal action. Fahringer
and Cambria were New York based attorneys; they were not admitted to
practice in Ohio. 3 On March 9, 1977, the judge of the court of common
pleas informed local counsel that neither of the out-of-state attorneys
would be allowed to represent Flynt or Hustler. The judge did not grant a
hearing and gave no justification for denial of their pro hac vice admissions. 4 The attorneys brought a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of
Ohio seeking to overturn the denial of admission. The Ohio Supreme
Court dismissed the action with no explanation, but on motion by plaintiffs the judge who had originally denied the admission was removed from
the case.- The attorneys instituted an action in federal district court seeking to enjoin the prosecution of Flynt and Hustler until they could be given
a hearing on the denial of their admission. The district court held that the
attorneys had been denied procedural due process requiring a hearing,
1. 99 S. Ct. 698 (1979).
2. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.31 (1965) (prohibits the dissemination of
harmful materials to minors).
3. Fahringer and Cambria were admitted to the permanent practice of law
in New York, specializing in criminal defense and obscenity law. In 1975 Fahringer received the Outstanding Practitioner of the Year award from the New
York Bar Association. Cambria graduated first in his class from the University of
Toledo-Ohio Law School. 99 S. Ct. 698, 705 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4. The two out-of-state attorneys appeared in person for the first time on
April 8, 1979, at which time their requests for admission were summarily denied.
The judge of the court of common pleas reportedly was quoted in a newspaper as
referring to Fahringer as a "fellow traveler" of pornographers. 99 S. Ct. 698, 703
n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
5. The Ohio Supreme Court found no evidence of bias or prejudice, but
stated that trial before a different judge would avoid even the appearance of impropriety. The new judge ruled that the Ohio Supreme Court's dismissal of the
mandamus action bound him to deny admission also. 99 S. Ct. at 700.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
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adequate advance notice, and a specification of alleged misconduct. 6 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed, 7 and the State of Ohio appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. With three justices dissenting,8 the Court held that
attorneys who were not admitted to the practice of law in Ohio did not
possess a property interest under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, and therefore were not entitled to a hearing when applying
for permission to appear pro hac vice.
The holding in Flynt severely restricts the multistate practice of law.
The former practice of requiring a showing of good cause for denial of pro
hac vice admissions will no longer be applicable in most situations. s This
note will analyze the Court's decision in Flynt and will discuss alternative
courses of action for an attorney denied pro hac vice admission in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
An appearance pro hac vice (for this particular occasion) was recognized as early as 1629 by the English Courts of Common Pleas. 10 It was used
extensively in the United States as early as 1876.11 Today, an appearance
pro hac vice involves the application by an out-of-state attorney for admission to try a single lawsuit in a jurisdiction where he is not admitted to the
permanent practice of law. Although a majority of the present federal and
state rules on pro hac vice are couched in language making the power to
admit an attorney discretionary,1 2 prior to Flynt there had been no
reported holdings permitting a judge to deny a pro hac vice application
6. See Flynt v. Leis, 434 F'. Supp. 481 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
7. See Flynt v. Leis, 574 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1978).
8. Justice White did not join the dissent and would have granted certiorari
and set the case for oral argument.
9. The Fifth Circuit has held that a federal district court cannot set up pro
hac vice rules so as to abridge the rights of civil rights litigants to use federal
courts. See Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968) (a district court can
refuse admission only upon a showing of unethical conduct); Lefton v. City of
Hattiesberg, 333 F.2d 280, 285 (5th Cir. 1965). See also Cooper v. Hutchinson,
184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950); Sherman, The Right to Representation by Out-ofState Attorneys in Civil Rights Cases, 4 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65 (1968).
The Sixth Circuit in Flynt noted that an out-of-state attorney could not be
refused pro hac vice admission on grounds of race, or other constitutionally forbidden reasons. However, it is impossible to know whether a court has denied admission based on forbidden reasons when the court is not required to grant a
hearing or give any justification for its decision. 574 F.2d at 878.
10. See Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950); Thursby v.
Warren, 79 Eng. Rep. 738 (1629); 6 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OFENGLISH LAW
435-36, 453 (2d ed. 1937); MERRIFIELD, THE LAW OF ATTORNIES 41-44 (1830).

11. See Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950); In re Mosness,
39 Wis. 509 (1876); 1 THORNTON, A TREATISE ON ATTORNIEs AT LAW § 22
(1914).
12.

See A. KATZ, ADMISSION OF NONRESIDENT ATTORNEYS PRO HAC VICE

1 (Reseach Contributions of the American Bar Association, No. 5, 1968). See also
Brakel & Loh, Regulatingthe Multistate Practiceof Law, 50 WASH. L. REv. 699,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/8
703 (1975); Note, EasingMultistate PracticeRestrictions- "Good Cause" Based
Limited Admission, 29 RUT. L. REV. 1183, 1200 (1976).
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arbitrarily. In cases where attorneys had been denied admission, the courts
had given the attorneys a hearing followed by a statement of reasons for
the denial. '

3

It has long been recognized that states have the power to exercise considerable control over out-of-state attorneys.1 4 Three justifications
generally have been given. The first is that a state has a duty to ensure that
attorneys practicing within its borders are competent. I5 Secondly, limiting
appearances of out-of-state attorneys makes easier the administration of
justice because local attorneys are more readily subject to service of process
and disciplinary proceedings.1 6 The third purpose, until recently con13. See, e.g., In re Rappaport, 558 F.2d 87, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1977) (violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility); Thomas v. Cassidy, 249 F.2d 91 (4th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 958 (1958) (attorney misconduct); Bundy v.
Rudd, 581 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1992 (1979) (attorney misconduct); United States v. Dinitz, 538 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977) (gross misconduct); In re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004,
1007 (5th Cir. 1975) (gross violation of Code of Professional Responsibility required); Ross v. Reda, 510 F.2d 1172 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975)
(violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility); Munoz v. United States
District Court, 446 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1971) (arbitrary denial of pro hac vice
reversed); Silverman v. Browning, 414 F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn), affd mem., 429
U.S. 876 (1976); Silverman v. Browning, 359 F. Supp. 173 (D. Conn. 1972), affd
mem., 411 U.S. 941 (1973); Inre Belli, 371 F. Supp. 111 (D.D.C. 1974) (attorney
misconduct); Norfolk &Western Ry. v. Beatty, 400 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Ill.), affd
mem., 423 U.S. 1009 (1975) (frequency of practice); E.F. Hutton & Co. v.
Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969); Brown v. Wood, 257 Ark. 252, 258,
516 S.W.2d 98, 101-02 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975) (frequency of
practice); McKenzie v. Burris, 255 Ark. 330, 334, 500 S.W.2d 357, 366 (1973);
New Jersey v. Kavanaugh, 52 N.J. 7, 18, 243 A.2d 225, 231, cert. denied, 393
U.S. 924 (1968) (violation of Code of Professional Responsibility); State v. Ross,
36 Ohio App. 2d 185, 188, 304 N.E.2d 396, 399 (1973), appeal dismissed, 415
U.S. 904 (1974); ,Smith v. Brock, 532 P.2d 843 (Okla. 1975) (attorney misconduct). See also Ainot., 33 A.L.R. Fed. 799 (1977).
14. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sperry v. Florida, 373
U.S. 379 (1963); Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961); Koningsberg v. State Bar,
366 U.S. 36 (1961); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); In
re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130
(1872); Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Beatty, 400 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Ill.), affd
mem., 423 U.S. 1009 (1975); Brown v. Supreme Court, 359 F. Supp. 549 (E.D.
Va.), affd mem., 414 U.S. 1034 (1973); Ginsberg v. Kovrak, 392 Pa. 143,
139 A.2d 889, appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 52 (1958). See also Note, Easing
Multistate PracticeRestrictions- "Good Cause" Based Limited Admission, 29
RUT. L. REV. 1183 (1976); cases cited note 13 supra.
15. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
16. See Brown v. Wood, 257 Ark. 252, 516 S.W.2d 98 (1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 963 (1975); McKenzie v. Burris, 255 Ark. 330, 344, 500 S.W.2d 357, 366
(1973) (economic protection of the local bar is a legitimate state interest); Note,
Appearance by Out-of-State Counsel- Connecticut Pro Hac Vice Rule Held
Constitutional,9 CONN. L. REV. 136 (1976); Note, Easing Multistate Practice
Restrictions-"Good
Cause"
Limited Admission,
29 RUT. L. REV. 1183,
Published
by University of Missouri
SchoolBased
of Law Scholarship
Repository, 1979
1186 (1976).
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sidered illegitimate by most courts, is the protection of the economic interests of the local bar.' 7 In the pro hac vice area the usual practice was
that an attorney would be denied admission for gross misconduct, 8 for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,' 9 or although rarely
stated, because the attorney was actually engaging in the regular practice
of law in a state where he was not admitted to permanent practice.2 0 In the
latter situation, if the attorney desired to practice law regularly in that
state, he would be compelled to apply for permanent admission to the bar.
The district court in Flynt recognized that none of the above mentioned grounds for refusal of admission were present. The court noted that
both attorneys were competent and qualified, and that no disciplinary action had been taken against either of them by any bar association. 2 ' It
found a legitimate claim of entitlement to due process because the attorneys initially had been granted pro hac vice admission by the trial court
judge. Relying upon Paulv. Davis22 and Board of Regents v. Roth, 2 the
district court stated that "when an 'interest' has been initially recognized
...by state law ... a deprivation or restriction of that 'interest' which results
in an injury to reputation requires procedural safeguards. 24 Although the
district court utilized this rationale in holding that the attorneys' due process rights had been violated, it went on to state that the right to a hearing
was the same whether an attorney was seeking initial admission or whether
25
admission had been granted and subsequently rescinded.
The Sixth Circuit concurred with the district court. It noted that while
they could "not define with certainty the status of the attorneys at the moment they were dismissed, 26 the Ohio court had approved their counsel of
record forms at Flynt's arraignment. The court posited that after recognition of the attorneys as attorneys of record, the judge could not withdraw
permission to appear without a meaningful hearing, the application of a
reasonably clear legal standard, and a rational basis for their exclusion.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts as to the status of
the attorneys. The Court believed that the plaintiffs had not been admitted as attorneys of record in the case. 2 7 It held that attorneys applying for
17. See authorities cited note 16 supra.
18. See generally cases cited note 13 supra.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See note 3 supra.
22. 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976).
23. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
24. Flynt v. Leis, 434 F. Supp. 481, 484 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
25. Id. at 486.
26. Flynt v. Leis, 574 F.2d 874, 879 (6th Cir. 1978).
27. 99 S. Ct. at 699. The Flynt Court ruled that the form used by the plaintiffs in the Ohio court did not constitute an application pro hac vice, and did not
alert the court that they were not admitted to practice in Ohio. The Court reasonhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/8
ed that because the judge was not aware that they were out-of-state attorneys, he
never recognized their pro hac vice admissions. However, the attorneys had ap-
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admission pro hac vice in state or federal courts are not entitled to pro-

cedural due process under the fourteenth amendment. Three major issues
are raised by implication by the Flynt decision, but not definitively resolved by the opinion. First, the Court somewhat summarily dispatched the attorneys' claim to a right of due process. The Court noted that no legitimate
claim of entitlement that would afford the attorneys the right to procedural due process could be found under current state or federal law. 28
The fact that there were existing customs in other jurisdictions did not
create a "mutually explicit [rule or] understanding" 29 that the attorneys
30
would be excluded only for permissible reasons by the Ohio courts.
In State v. Ross, I however, an Ohio appellate court held that it was an
abuse of discretion to arbitrarily deny admission to out-of-state attorneys.
In that case the court did not have to deal with the issue of denial of a hearing because the attorney had been given a hearing. It was thus arguable
that Ohio had created an understanding with foreign attorneys that they

peared before the same court in the past, and it was aware that they were not admitted in Ohio. See note 4 supra. The Fifth Circuit in Bundy v. Rudd, 581 F.2d
1126, 1131 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1992 (1979), agreed with the
district court as to the attorneys' status. It also believed that the attorneys in Flynt
had been admitted pro hac ice and were later terminated by the Ohio court with
no hearing.
28. The Constitution does not reate property interests. They must be derived from an independent source such as state or federal law. See Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709
(1976); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
572-74 (1975); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The Court
has also recognized the existence of an unwritten common law property interest. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Such an interest may be
found, although not written in any federal or state statute. The Sixth Circuit
alluded to the existence of an unwritten common law interest when it discussed
the prevalence and history of pro hac vice practice in American courts. However,
any such interest was ignored by the court in Flynt.
29. 99 S. Ct. at 701. See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972)
(where there is a mutual understanding that will support a claim of entitlement,
it is sufficient to create procedural due process rights).
30. The Flynt Court stated that while some courts may require a showing of
good cause for denial of pro hac vice admission, others are under no duty to do so.
It also stated that it knew of no holding creating a constitutional right by estoppel
merely because an expressly discretionary state privilege had been granted
generously in the past. 99 S.Ct. at 702 n.5. This reasoning may be inconsistent
with the Court's decision in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Perry
holds that the generous granting of a privilege in the past may give rise to a
mutual understanding that it will be granted in the future. This mutual
understanding would entitle a claimant to the protections of the fourteenth
amendment. The Supreme Court also previously held that the practice of law is
not a privilege but a right. See Baird v. Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4

Wall.) 333 (1866).
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396,1979399 (1973), appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 904 (1974).
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would not be arbitrarily denied admission.3 2 Support for this view is
evidenced by the dissenting opinion in Flynt which noted that "[a] state requirement that a judge's action in a contested matter be predicated on a
permissible reason inevitably gives rise to a procedural requirement that
'33
the affected litigants have some opportunity to reason with the judge.
The majority also was not persuaded that the designation of the judge's
power as "discretionary" in rules and statutes limited the power to -deny
pro hac vice appearances, holding in effect that "discretionary" is the
equivalent of "arbitrary." In fact, the term discretionary as used in rules
and statutes does not generally signify that discretion can be exercised at
the whim or caprice of the individual. In Goldsmith v. UnitedStates Board

of Tax Appeals, 34 the Court held that a statute that appeared to be discretionary had to be construed to mean, "discretion to be exercised after fair
investigation ....

cess." 3 5 A

notice [and] hearing ...

as would constitute due pro-

majority of decisions hold that a statute that employs the term
"discretionary" should not be interpreted to mean that the holder of that
discretion has unlimited power.3 6 Ohio law itself refutes the proposition
that a rule couched in discretionary language relieves a judge of the duty to
7
justify an arbitrary or capricious exercise of it.
Finally, the Supreme Court, in support of the holding that a state trial
judge arbitrarily can deny an attorney's pro hac vice application, cited
only three cases, all of which are inapposite. Brown v. Supreme Court of
Virginia3 8 and Ginsberg v. Kovrak 39 dealt expressly with permanent admission requirements. The third case, Norfolk & Western Railway v. Beat-

ty, 40 upheld the constitutionality of a pro hac vice statute but did not involve an arbitrary denial of admission. In Brown a federal district court
upheld a Virginia statute that made admission requirements for attorneys
who passed the Virginia bar exam different from those for attorneys who
32.
33.

See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972).
99 S. Ct. at 708. See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).

34. 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
35. Id. at 123.
36. See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 390, 393 (10th Cir.
1956) (the term discretion means sound discretion directed by reason" and conscience to a just result).
37. See State v. Ross, 36 Ohio App. 2d 185, 188, 304 N.E. 2d 396, 399
(1973), appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 904 (1974); See, e.g., State v. Ferranto, 112
Ohio St. 667, 676, 148 N.E. 362, 364 (1925); Davis v. Shigley, 88 Ohio App. 423,
425-26, 100 N.E.2d 261, 263 (1950); Mutual Home Savings Ass'n v. Merion, 67
Ohio App. 439,449, 37 N.E.2d 109, 119 (1941); Fessenden v. Fessenden, 32 Ohio
App. 16, 165 N.E. 746 (1928).
38. 359 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Va.), affd mem., 414 U.S. 1034 (1973), cited in
99 S. Ct. at 701.
39. 392 Pa. 143, 139 A.2d 889, appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 52 (1958), cited
in 99 S. Ct. at 701.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/8
40. 400 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Ill.), affid mem., 423 U.S. 1009 (1975), cited in
99 S. Ct. at 701.
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sought admission based on comity or reciprocity. The Virginia statute controlling reciprocity vested the Supreme Court of Virginia with the discretion to grant a certificate without examination. In upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the district court noted that discretion cannot be
exercised in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory manner. Thus,
Brown is questionable as authority for Flynt because it deals only with permanent admission and does not sanction arbitrary exercises of discretionary power. Ginsberginvolved similar facts and likewise is not pertinent
to Flynt; it dealt not with an application for a single appearance in association with a local attorney, but rather with a Pennsylvania attorney who
contended that because he was admitted to practice in the federal courts,
he had the right to practice generally in the courts of Pennsylvania.
More nearly in point but still clearly distinguishable is the third cited
authority, Norfolk & Western Railway v. Beatty, 41 in which the Illinoispro
hac vice statute was held constitutional. Missouri attorneys not admitted to
permanent practice in Illinois were deniedpro hac vice admission by an Illinois circuit court judge after it had been shown that they had been
representing Norfolk in numerous lawsuits in Illinois courts on a continuing basis. The definition of pro hac vice-"for a single cause" 42 -alone illustrates a major dissimilarity between Norfolk and Flynt. Norfolk is also
notably distinguishable from Flynt because it did not involve an arbitrary
43
denial of admission and was not disposed of on due process grounds.
The implication of Flynt is that an attorney who is denied pro hac vice
admission will not be entitled to a hearing to either protest or request
reasons for the denial; he will be forced to rely on a claim other than a
violation of procedural due process to vindicate his own or his client's
rights. Three alternative arguments may be asserted: (1) a violation of the
privileges and immunities clause; 44 (2) denial of substantive due process
under the fourteenth amendment; 45 or
(3) a denial of his client's right to
4
counsel under the sixth amendment. 6
41, Id.
42. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1131 (4th ed. 1951).
43. The attorneys in Norfolk relied on a violation of the privileges and immunities clause. They argued that it gave them the right to represent their client
in all FELA claims pending in the Illinois courts. 400 F. Supp. at 236.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides in part: "No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States ...."
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1, provides in part: "[N]or shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
46. U.S. CONST.amend. VI, provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . .to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense." First amendment rights of a litigant may also be violated when he is
denied the attorney of his choice. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia
State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Sherman,
Published
by Right
University
of Missouri School ofbyLaw
Scholarship Repository,
1979in Civil Rights Cases, 4
The
to Representation
Out-of-State
Attorneys
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Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp.47 was the first case to recognize the
existence of a claim under the privileges and immunities clause. Judge
Friendly, speaking for the Second Circuit, held that under the privileges
and immunities clause no state could prohibit a citizen with a federal claim
or defense from engaging an out-of-state attorney. Underlying this
holding was the belief that any measure necessary for the assertion of a
federal claim or defense could not be restricted by state law. Spanos
recognized that there is conflict between federal interests in the effective
assertion of federal rights and defenses and state interests in regulating
those who practice law within a state's borders. 48 It is not clear to what extent a federal claim or defense under the privileges and immunities clause
might reach, or whether the right to an attorney exists only for advice or
whether it also includes the right to have a foreign attorney participate ful49
ly in a trial.
Although the Court in Flynt noted that Spanos has been limited if not
entirely rejected by Norfolk,"0 the facts in Flynt and Norfolk are at such
variance that a privileges and immunities clause argument should still retain vitality especially where an attorney has been denied admission for arbitrary or discriminatory reasons.

47. 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966). Spanos
recently has been affirmed by the Second Circuit. See Bedrosian v. Mintz, 518
F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1975). In Bedrosian the complaint before the court did not involve a federal claim or defense. The court explicitly noted that Spanos would still
be followed, but would be limited to cases involving a federal claim or defense.
Therefore, Spanos would seem to offer no help to an attorney who is denied pro
hac vice admission where he cannot characterize the interest as a federal claim or
defense. But see 364 F.2d at 170-71, where Judge Friendly stated that what is
basically a federal claim or defense may depend in part on an issue or claim which
has its source in state law.
48. See Note, Retaining Out-of-State Counsel: The Evolution of a Federal
Right, 67 COLuM. L. REV. 731 (1967); Note, ConstitutionalRight to Engage an
Out-of-State Attorney, 19 STAN. L. REv. 856 (1967).Judge Friendly found support for his position in the growing attorney specialization in many areas of the
law, and in the increased mobility of the bar. 364 F.2d at 170.
49. See authorities cited note 48 supra. Commentators have interpreted
"federal claim or defense" to include such areas as antitrust, income tax, patents,
copyrights, trademarks, securities, and labor regulation. In the criminal area the
phrase "federal defenses" has been interpreted to include illegal search and
seizure, denial of equal protection, due process, deprivation of counsel during
pre-arraignment proceedings, and deprivations of freedom of speech, religion,
and association. For a discussion of the scope of participation allowed, see Note,
Easing Multistate Practice Restrictions- "Good Cause" Based Limited Admission, 29 RUT. L. REV. 1183 (1976); Note, The Practiceof Law by Out-of-State
Attorneys, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1276 (1967). See also Norfolk & Western Ry. v.
Beatty, 400 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Ill.), affd mem., 423 U.S. 1009 (1975) (rejected
Spanos and only allowed attorneys to advise clients). In Spanos the court advocated full participation subject only to valid rules of courts as to practice before
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/8
them. 364 F.2d at 170.
50. 400 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Ill.), affd mem., 423 U.S. 1009 (1975).
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The second argument that might succeed under circumstances similar
to those in Flynt would be under the substantive due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 5' A successful application of this theory would require an attorney to prove that a discretionary pro hac vice statute does
not pass the minimum rational basis test and is not related to any
legitimate end of government. The only occasion for the Supreme Court to
deal specifically with this issue has been Martin v. Walton. 52 In Martin the
Court held that a Kansas rule requiring Missouri attorneys practicing pro
hac vice in Kansas to associate with local counsel was not beyond the
allowable range of state action under the fourteenth amendment. The pro
hac vice rule in Kansas would apply equally to all attorneys and could not
result in arbitrary denials of admission. Therefore, Martinwould have little effect on a substantive due process argument based on facts similar to
Flynt.
The Court has summarily affirmed two recent federal district court
cases holding that state pro hac vice statutes do not violate substantive due
process. 5 3 In the first case, Silverman v. Browning,54 the plaintiff was a
NewJersey attorney who was denied admissionpro hac vice in Connecticut
for no apparent reason. At the time, Connecticut had no rule that clearly
set forth the rights of out-of-state attorneys to practice pro hac vice in its
courts. The federal district court held that "an inconsistent non-system existed," 5 5 and that there was a violation of the fourteenth amendment
under this non-rule. However, the court abstained from making any decision until Connecticut framed a proper statute that set forth the rights of
foreign attorneys.
One year later the same court again abstained because the new statute
had not yet been interpreted by the Connecticut courts. In voting to abstain, Judge Newman stated that the statute clearly violated substantive
due process under the fourteenth amendment because it would permit ar51. Substantive due process deals with the constitutionality of a rule and not
with the fairness of the process by which it is applied. Usually, a rule need only rationally relate to a legitimate end of government. The Court in the past has held
that as long as there is some conceivable basis for a finding of a rational relation, a
statute will be upheld. See Ferguson v. Skrupka, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304
U.S. 144 (1938). See also note 52 infra.
52. 368 U.S. 25 (1961). Two justices dissented noting that under Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), a state could not set up rules that
have no rational connection to the fitness or capacity to practice law. Arguably an
association requirement is related to these interests because it guarantees that the
out-of-state attorney will be associated with a local attorney who is familiar with
the procedural rules of the state.
53. Generally a summary affirmance by the Court is a disposition on the
merits. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 671 (1974); C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 551 (3d ed. 1976). See
also Note, 52 B. L. REV. 373 (1972).
Published by
Missouri173
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Law Scholarship
Repository,
1979411 U.S. 941 (1973).
mem.,
(D.ofConn.
1972), affd
54.University
359 F.ofSupp.
55. Id. at 175.
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bitrary rulings; 56 however, he believed that the state courts would resolve
the question. This absention was affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court.
The same case was litigated four years later in Silverman v. Browning
JL 57 With Judge Newman dissenting, the court held that the recently formulated Connecticut statute did not violate substantive due process. The
authority relied on by the majority in Silverman II had been recently affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Norfolk & Western Railway
v. Beatty. -8 Norfolk is questionable authority for the decision in Silverman
II. It was decided by rejecting not a substantive due process contention,
but by rejecting an argument that there had been a violation of the
privileges and immunities clause. 5 9 Also, the attorneys in Norfolk had asked to represent their client on a regular basis in Illinois courts, while in
Silverman II the attorney had asked only to represent his client in an
isolated case in Connecticut.60 The effect of the two cases on the vitality of
a substantive due process argument is not easily discerned. 6' Neither case
holds that pro hac vice statutes that are framed in such a way as to allow arbitrary denials of admission do not violate substantive due process. Thus,
the Supreme Court has not squarely ruled on a substantive due process
argument based on an arbitrary or capricious denial of admission.
The case upon which an attorney asserting a fourteenth amendment
claim should rely is Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,6 2 holding that
legislation regulating attorneys that contains general conditions of an arbitrary or discriminatory character violates the fourteenth amendment.
The decision mandates good moral character and legal proficiency as the
only legitimate interests a state may consider in formulating admission
statutes for attorneys. The difficulty with Schware is that it considered only legislation which bars attorneys from the permanent practice of law.
However, there appears to be no authority for the proposition that the
56. Id. at 179.
57. Silverman v. Browning, 414 F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn.), affd mem., 429
U.S. 876 (1976).
58. 400 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Ill.), affd mem., 423 U.S. 1009 (1975).
59. Although a minor contention of the plaintiffs-attorneys in Norfolk was that
there had been a violation of substantive due process, it is clear from the opinion that
the case was disposed of by rejecting a privilege and immunities clause argument. Id. at
236.
60. Judge Newman in his dissenting opinion in Silverman II noted that it
was error to rely on Norfolk because the attorneys in Norfolk "were asserting the
right to be represented by out-of-state counsel in all the FELA cases against
them." 414 F. Supp. at 88.
61. It is curious that the court in Silverman I relied on Norfolk for its decision. It noted that if the attorneys representing the railroad in Norfolk had been
in Connecticut instead of Illinois, the Connecticut statute would have mandated
their admission. This left the Connecticut court in the awkward position of relying on Norfolk for its decision, but stating that it would have decided Norfolk differently. See Silverman v. Browning, 414 F. Supp. 80, 87 (D. Conn.), aff'd mem.,
429 U.S. 876 (1976).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/8
62. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
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Supreme Court, if confronted with an argument based on Schware, would
63
limit the case exclusively to facts involving permanent admission.
Finally, it could be argued that an arbitrary denial of admission
violates a criminal defendant's right to counsel under the sixth amendment. 64 The Flynt Court explicitly noted that the decision did not reach
the issue of whether the constitutional rights of Flynt and Hustlerhad been
violated. 65 The issue was inappropriate for the federal courts because the
66
Younger v. Harrts
abstention doctrine does not permit federal interference with state proceedings when the issue can be raised in the state
courts. The seminal case of Powell v. Alabama67 recognized that the right
to counsel in criminal cases is guaranteed by the sixth amendment. The
holding in Powell was incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and
applied to the states in Gideon v. Wainright.68 In United States v.
Bergamo69 the Third Circuit held that admission of a criminal defendant's
out-of-state attorney was mandatory in the federal courts. This holding
63. See generally Brakel & Loh, Regulatingthe Multistate Practiceof Law,
50 WASH. L. REV. 699 (1975); Note, Retaining Out-of-State Counsel: The Evolution of a FederalRight, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 731 (1967); Note, Appearances by

Out.of-State Counsel- Connecticut Pro Hac Vice Rule Held Constitutional, 9
CONN. L. REV. 136 (1976); Note, ConstitutionalLaw: The Power of the State to
Deny an Individual a License to PracticeLaw, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 559 (1972);
Note, EasingMutistate PracticeRestrictions- "Good Cause" Based Limited Admission, 29 RUT. L. REV. 1183 (1976); Note, The Practiceof Law by Out-of-State
Attorneys, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1276 (1967); Note, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 204

(1967); Note, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 569 (1967).
64. The sixth amendment guarantees the right to the assistance of counsel
for criminal defendants only. A more general right to counsel of one's choice in all
cases, civil and criminal, has arisen from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69
(1932). See note 67 infra. The general right to counsel of one's choice has been
derived from the sixth and fourteenth amendments. Although recognized by

both scholars and case law, its scope is not definite. See authorities cited note 63
supra. For a general discussion of the right to the counsel of one's choice, see Sherman, The Right to Representation by Out-of-State Attorneys in Civil Rights
Cases, 4 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65 (1968); Comment, Interstateand InternationalPracticeof Law, 31 S. CAL. L. REV. 416, 420 (1958); Note, Attorneys: In-

terstateand FederalPractice, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1711, 1724 n.62 (1967); Note,
ConstitutionalRight to Engage an Out-of-State Attorney, 19 STAN. L. REV. 856,
867-69 (1967); Note, 4 Hous. L. REV. 722 (1967).
65. 99 S. Ct. at 702 n.2. Three justices in the dissenting opinion believed
that the sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated.
66. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See also Comment, "OurFederalism"- The Limitation of Younger - Samuels and Their Progeny on FederalIntervention in State
Court Proceedings, 42 Mo. L. REV. 559 (1977).
67. 287 U.S. 45, 70 (1932) ("If in any case civil or criminal a state or federal
court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such refusal would be a
denial of a hearing, and therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense.").
68. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972).
154 F.2d
31 (3d Cir.
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70
was later limited by Cooperv. Hutchinson,'
in which the same court held
that Bergamo exemplified only federal judicial policy of the Third Circuit
that need not be followed by the states. Later, in United States v.
Dinitz, "the Fifth Circuit was confronted with a district court exclusion of
foreign counsel chosen by a criminal defendant. In upholding the district
court decision, the court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel is
absolute and unqualified, but went on to note that at some point short of
complete freedom of choice a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right
to counsel is satisfied. In deciding a sixth amendment claim, the Supreme
Court may balance the interests of the defendant against the state's interests served by denying admission of his foreign attorney. To be successful under this approach, an attorney must assert that the interests of a
72
defendant in any criminal case far outweigh any possible state interest.

Many alternatives have been suggested to solve the myriad of problems
caused by the application of pro hac vice rules. Attorneys who practice only locally prefer adherence to restrictive pro hac vice statutes. Specialists
and attorneys engaged in the multistate practice of law advocate modernization of the present system. The existing rules are no longer adequate to
fill the needs of the client. It will be in the best interests of all litigants that
the present discretionary rules be abandoned. Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: "The legal profession should discourage
regulations that unreasonably impose territorial restraints upon the right
of a lawyer to handle the affairs of his client."
The long-term solution to problems of appearances by out-of-state attorneys must be addressed by legislative or judicial reevaluation. State and
federalpro hac vice rules should be adopted which impose a good cause requirement for denial of admission. 73 If an attorney has shown good moral
character and his legal proficiency is not questioned, he should be allowed
to practice pro hac vice in any jurisdiction. An appearance should be
denied only upon-a showing that the foreign attorney is actually engaging
in the regular practice of law in the state, committing gross misconduct, or
70. 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950).
71. 538 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1976).
72. Practical problems exist with the use of such an argument. If denial of
admission pro hac vice violates a litigant's right to counsel of his choice, he may be
required to prove that he has been prejudiced by the denial. On appeal it may be
difficult if not impossible to prove that a litigant has suffered actual harm. See
Silverman v. Browning, 414 F. Supp. 80, 88 n.1 (D. Conn.), affd mem., 429 U.S.
876 (1976). For cases recognizing the right to counsel of one's choice, see In re
Rappaport, 558 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1977); Bedrosian v. Mintz, 518 F.2d 396 (2d
Cir. 1975);Bundy v. Rudd, 581 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1978); Sanders v. Russell, 401
F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968); Lefton v. City of Hattiesberg, 333 F.2d 280 (5th Cir.
1964);Ross v. Reda, 510 F.2d 1172 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892
(1975);United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert denied, 99 S.
Ct. 837 (1979); Silverman v. Browning, 359 F. Supp. 173 (D. Conn.), affd mem.,
411 U.S. 941 (1973) (dissent).
73. See cases cited note 13 supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/8

12

